Culturally Inclusive Psychology from a Constructionist Standpoint

KENNETH J. GERGEN

To illuminate the life of a single individual is a contribution to history; to illuminate what is true of all human beings is to make history. Such is the underlying logic of psychological science since its inception. The major search has been—and continues to be—toward establishing fundamental principles or laws of perception, cognition, motivation, emotion, learning, aggression, and so on. In contrast, case studies, biographical research, and life-history research occupy but a minor and typically neglected niche in disciplinary structure. Psychology is not alone in this penchant within the social or behavioral sciences. Particularly within sociology and economics, the search for general theories is dominant. This universalizing posture owes its existence, in important part, to natural science research and to the supporting role of 20th century philosophy of science. As the 20th century unfolded, the generalizing sciences of chemistry, physics, biology, and medicine had demonstrated substantial productivity, and logical positivist metatheory provided a congenial rationale for privileging the general over the specific. In effect, a fully sophisticated and empirically grounded theory of the general would be able to account for all particulars, while a focus on particulars could never yield a general theory. Here was indeed a first step toward inclusion, as psychological scientists from all cultures could be welcomed into participation.

Yet, in recent decades this search for universals has come under increasing criticism. Specifically, in its exclusive focus on human nature in general, specific cultural configurations are erased from view. Not only do cultural differences fail to figure in these generalized formulations, but the specific concepts, values, and practices of the many cultures of the world are silenced. As increasingly voiced, Western psychology has defined itself as a universal psychology, and has thus functioned as a suppressive form of colonization. Increasingly, then, attempts have been made to recognize and appreciate specific cultural variations. At the same time, the attraction of culture specific psychologies has not been without its pitfalls. Most specifically, should each culture establish its own form of psychology, there would be a resulting balkanization of the discipline. In effect, psychology
would cease to exist as a singular field of study, or indeed a discipline of study at all. How can we, then, develop a culture inclusive psychology, a psychology that at once can speak to all, with a place for all to speak?

In what follows I wish first to scan the recent history of debate, earmarking ways in which the “noble dream” of a universalist psychology have been threatened and reconfigured in recent years. As I will hope to demonstrate, the major problems blocking the way to a culturally inclusive psychology derive from an array of traditional assumptions about knowledge, the person, and culture. Such assumptions both invite and ultimately preclude the possibility for a culturally inclusive discipline. I will then sketch out the contours of a social constructionist orientation to these issues. With this sketch in hand, we can return to the challenge of cultural inclusion, and explore alternative routes to global collaboration.

**FROM UNIVERSAL TO CULTURAL INCLUSION**

In my view, the early and still dominant view of psychology as a universal science was both well intentioned and naïve. It was well intentioned, as it drew from the image of natural science gains in areas such as medicine and technology. If there were logics by which malaria could be cured and electrical energy harnessed throughout the world, then these same logics could promisingly be applied to problems in learning, motivation, mental illness, and so on. It was to be a psychology for all people. Initially, the development of cross-cultural psychology merely provided a qualification mechanism in the grander design for generating universal truth. That is, it was the task of cross-cultural psychology to test the universal claims in contrasting cultural settings, thus yielding validation and/or qualification. Exemplary is Ekman and Friesen’s (1971) research in which claims were made to the universality of emotional expression, but with variations attributed to local rules of emotional display. This commitment to a universalist psychology remains largely intact within cross-cultural psychology, as exemplified in Matsumoto’s Preface to the 2001 edition of the *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology*. As he points out, a major theme across all chapters of the Handbook is “A vision of the future as continued evolution of cross-cultural psychology, particularly as it aids in the creation of a universal psychology that is applicable to all people.” (p. viii)

Yet, the question of why certain universal hypotheses do not generalize across cultural settings also led many cross-cultural psychologists to inquire into the specific cultural conditions at stake. In effect, the focus on universal psychological functioning invited curiosity into specific cultural processes. The classic work of Triandis (1995) and others on individualist vs. collectivist cultures is exemplary. In turn, this concern with specific cultural conditions gave way to a much more radical view, to whit, varying cultural conditions give rise to differing forms of psychological functioning. If fully extended, this line of reasoning would mean the
collapse of a universalist psychology. The entire compendium of mental life might vary from one cultural setting to another. However, the movement toward a cultural psychology has continued to avoid such a conclusion. Rather, drawing from Vygotsky (1978) Bruner (1991), and Shweder (1991), among others, the conceptual center-piece of the cultural psychology movement has been “human meaning,” or more formally, “cognitive content.” Exemplary here is the work of Markus and Kitayama (1991) on cultural variations in the concept of self. In effect, while a full-blown cultural psychology would threaten the universalist fantasy, there are many ways in which the fantasy is simultaneously sustained. There is first the dualist assumption common across the spectrum of cultural psychology. In all cases there are, after all, “minds within bodies,” with such Western concepts as cognition, emotion, the self, inter-subjectivity, and values felicitously dominating the spectrum of inquiry. Further, research in cultural psychology embraces empiricist assumptions concerning the use of methods (e.g. experiments, surveys, ethnography) to establish validity in representation. Thus, while general laws or principles are subverted by the cultural psychology movement, the possibility remains inherent of establishing a universal, scientifically based account of psychological functioning, as it varies from one culture to another.

The seeds for a more radical departure from Western universalism are to be found in the indigenous psychology movement. Here we find a strong motivation to combat the otherwise imperialistic thrust of the West. As proposed in this case, broad cultural variations exist not only in the concept of the person, but in the concept of knowledge and its associated practices. Thus there have been attempts to establish psychologies that are inherently and distinctively linked to varying cultural traditions. Illustrative are indigenous movements in China (Huang, 2012), India (Misra and Kumar, 2011), and the Philippines (Pe-Pua and Protacio-Marcelino, 2000). Such movements would not stand in some lesser position to Western universalism—foot-noting minor variations on an otherwise general psychology—but stand on equal footing. For, as it is reasoned, Western psychology is simply one more brand of indigenous psychology (Gergen, Gulerce, Lock, and Misra, 1996).

Yet, there are many within the camp of cultural psychology, in particular, who question the indigenous movement. At the outset, to the extent that conceptions of knowledge are culturally specific, then indigenous psychology would fall outside the Western concept of science. Differing conceptions of mind—or indeed the lack of any conception of biologically based mental process—would prohibit movements toward integration and generalization. Particularly worrisome is the question of communication. As the argument goes, if each culture lives and understands within its own framework, how would cross-cultural understanding be possible? One can only understand another in terms shared within one’s own culture. Thus, for example, one cannot translate across indigenous movements, in an attempt to locate universals lurking beneath the seeming differences. Attempts
to translate invariably function imperialistically, reformulating the otherwise exotic into the familiar, thus breeding a false sense that “they are just like us.” Rather, indigenous systems of understanding and action are fundamentally incommensurable, worlds in themselves. The implications of this argument are profound indeed. Ultimately at question here is the capacity of any scientist/scholar to generate a valid representation of the peoples of any culture, save in the terms of that culture itself. Validity is fundamentally a local matter, achieved only through local negotiations. Or, to extend the argument, no one can legitimately represent anyone else, and the attempts of science to describe and explain in its terms are a disservice to those who are objectified in these terms. The possibilities for of a culturally inclusive psychology indeed seem grim. As a result, varying attempts have been made to fold the indigenous movement back into a more universalist frame.

As we find, in its current state, the issue of a universally shared, or culturally inclusive psychology is fraught with conflict. There is first the tension between advocates of universal principles and who view such research as blind to cultural variation. Among those concerned with cultural variation, there are tensions between those favoring an empirical assessment of a given psychological universe, and those who question the adequacy of any over-arching concept of knowledge or of the person. Further, there are reverberating concerns with the imperialist thrust of any set of truth claims or universal rationalities issuing from a singular cultural location. Added to these problems are critiques emerging from cultural studies and anthropology. As argued in the former case, virtually all attempts to characterize culture in general are misleading. Within local venues and local conditions, or as a result of particular histories, people will develop unique forms of understanding and patterns of behavior. In effect, what we call “culture” represents a gloss on what is more properly understood as an immense array of sub-cultures. One cannot speak of Chinese, Indian, or American culture, for example, because there are enormous variations among sub-cultures as you move across the lands.

Coupled with this critique of cultural analysis is the emerging lament in anthropology over the disappearance of culture. Given the global diffusion of the world’s peoples, along with the globe spanning circulation of ideas, values, and images on the inter-net, the idea of coherent, geographically based cultures becomes moribund. Cross-cultural comparisons become irrelevant (Hermans and Kempen, 1998). Anthropologists increasingly turn their attention to the global flows of peoples, along with those of media, technology, ideas and habits (Clifford, 1997; Appadurai, 2001). Concern with shifting identities, colonization, and hybridization all become prominent.

Although this array of conundrums is indeed formidable, hopes for a culturally inclusive psychology are not destroyed. In particular, many of the existing problems derive from assumptions that are not themselves placed under scrutiny. This is to say that the formulation of a problem invariably issues from a set of assumptions. If the assumptions can be challenged, the force of “the problem” is
subverted. Perhaps the major adjunct to such critical reflexivity derives from the social constructionist movement in the scholarly world more generally. In what follows, I will briefly outline several significant strands of constructionist thought. With these ideas in place, we can return to the challenge of cultural inclusion, and open paths to more promising potentials.

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE

Although one may trace certain roots of social constructionism to Vico, Nietzsche, and Dewey, scholars often view Berger and Luckmann’s (1966), *The social construction of reality* as the landmark volume. Yet, because of its lodgment in social phenomenology, this work has largely been eclipsed by more recent scholarly developments. One may locate these primary stimulants in at least three, quite independent movements. In effect, the convergence of these movements provides the basis for social constructionist inquiry today (Gergen, 2009).

The first movement may be viewed as critical, and refers to the mounting ideological critique of all authoritative accounts of the world, including those of empirical science. Such critique can be traced at least to the Frankfurt School, but today is more fully embodied in the work of Foucault (1978), and associated movements within feminist, black, gay and lesbian, and anti-psychiatry enclaves. The second significant movement, the literary/rhetorical, originates in the fields of literary theory and rhetorical study. Post-structural literary theory has been especially prominent, including deconstructionist theory. Rhetorical study, in particular, demonstrates the extent to which scientific theories, explanations and descriptions of the world are not so much dependent upon the world in itself as on discursive conventions. Traditions of language in use construct what we take to be the world. The third context of ferment, the social, may be traced to the collective scholarship in the history of science, the sociology of knowledge, and social studies of science. Here the major focus is on the social processes giving rise to what is accepted as knowledge, both scientific and otherwise.

In what follows I shall briefly outline a number of the most widely shared agreements to emerge from these various movements. These lines of argument tend to link the three movements and to form the basis of contemporary social constructionism.

The Social Origins of Knowledge

Perhaps the most generative idea emerging from the constructionist dialogues is that what we take to be knowledge of the world and self finds its origins in human relationships. What we take to be true as opposed to false, objective as opposed to subjective, scientific as opposed to mythological, rational as opposed to irrational,
moral as opposed to immoral is brought into being through historically and culturally situated social processes. This view stands in dramatic contrast to two of the most important intellectual and cultural traditions of the West. First is the tradition of the individual knower, the rational, self-directing, morally centered and knowledgeable agent of action. Within the constructionist dialogues we find that it is not the individual mind in which knowledge, reason, emotion and morality reside, but in relationships.

The communal view of knowledge also represents a major challenge to the presumption of universal truth, or the possibility that the accounts of scientists, or any other group, reveal or approach function as valid representations about what is the case. In effect, propose the constructionists, no one arrangement of words is necessarily more objective or accurate in its depiction of the world than any other. To be sure, accuracy may be achieved within a given community or tradition—according to its rules and practices. Physics and chemistry generate useful truths from within their communal traditions, just as psychologists, sociologists, and priests do from within theirs. But from these often competing traditions there is no means by which one can locate a transcendent truth. Any attempt to establish the superior account would itself be the product of a given community of agreement.

The Centrality of Language

Central to the constructionist account of the social origins of knowledge is a concern with language. If accounts of the world are not demanded by what there is, then the traditional view of language as a mapping device ceases to compel. Rather, constructionists tend to draw from Wittgenstein’s (1953) view of language as a form of relational game. And, given that games of language are essentially conducted in a rule-like fashion, accounts of the world are governed in significant degree by conventions of language use. Empirical research could not reveal, for example, that “emotions are oblong.” The utterance is grammatically correct, but there is no way one could empirically verify or falsify such a proposition. Rather, while it is perfectly satisfactory to speak of emotions as varying in intensity or depth, discursive conventions for constructing emotional life in the 21st century do not happen to include the adjective, “oblong.”

Social constructionists also tend to accept Wittgenstein’s view of language games as embedded within broader “forms of life.” Thus, for example, the language conventions for communicating about human emotion are linked to certain activities, objects and settings. For the empirical researcher there may be “assessment devices” for emotion (e.g. questionnaires, thematic analysis of discourse, controlled observations of behavior), and statistical technologies to assess differences between groups. Given broad agreement within a field of study about “the way the game is played,” conclusions can be reached about the nature of human emotion. As constructionists also suggest, playing by the rules of a given

© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
community is enormously important to sustaining these relationships. Not only does conformity to the rules affirm the reality, rationality and values of the research community, but the very raison d’être of the profession itself is sustained. To abandon the discourse would render the accompanying practices unintelligible. Without conventions of construction, action loses value.

The Politics of Knowledge

As should be evident, social constructionism is closely allied with a pragmatic conception of knowledge. That is, traditional issues of truth and objectivity are replaced by concerns with that which research brings forth. It is not whether an account is true from a god’s eye view that matters, but rather, the implications for cultural life that follow from taking any truth claim seriously. This concern with consequences essentially eradicates the longstanding distinction between fact and value, between is and ought. The forms of life within any knowledge making community represent and sustain the values of that community. In establishing “what is the case,” the research community also places value on their particular metatheory of knowledge, constructions of the world, and practices of research. When others embrace such knowledge they wittingly or unwittingly extend the reach of these values. This line of reasoning has had enormous repercussions in the academic community and beyond. This is so especially for scholars and practitioners concerned with social injustice, oppression, and the marginalization of minority groups in society. More generally, however, it suggests that evaluations of the pragmatic consequences of a given line of inquiry cannot be separated from political, ideological, and moral issues. In short, social constructionism represents a form of critical pragmatism.

CULTURALLY INCLUSIVE PSYCHOLOGY REVISITED

Given this brief account of a social constructionist view of knowledge, how are we to address the prospects of a culturally inclusive psychology? Let us return to the central problems that have thus far occluded the path to a culturally inclusive psychology.

Critical Pragmatics: From Universals to Particulars

If we follow the constructionist lines of reasoning, and view all truth posits as both derived and validated through social process, then we can dissolve many of the traditional lines of argument separating the various encampments of concern. That is, the validity of universal psychology is no longer in question from the
standpoint of the cross-culturalist, nor the validity of the cross culturalist from the standpoint of the cultural or indigenous psychologist. None of these orientations can make claims to transcendental truth—beyond history and social setting—whether speaking of human kind in general or any particular cultural or sub-cultural enclave. Further, in abandoning transcendental truth claims in any of these cases, we also subvert the otherwise oppressive sub-text: “this is the voice of truth, and all voices in disagreement are untrustworthy or fallacious.” In terms of transcendental truth-value representations of human action are the equivalent of song or dance.

This is not at all to denigrate the process of representation in any of these cases. Rather, it is to raise other questions concerning the function of description and explanation. Specifically for the constructionist, the concern turns to matters of pragmatic consequence and the values implicit or explicit in these consequences. In other terms, who is benefited by the various representations, in what ways, and with what socio-political implications? In this light let us reconsider the universalist form of Western psychology. We first remove the truth warrant of its claims and the rational foundations for its methods of inquiry. We may then ask about the utility of such inquiry and its associated values. What do the world’s peoples gain by asking them to “try out a lens” in which they see themselves as having the same emotions, motives, or processes of reasoning? It’s as if to say, “You thought we were all different, but what happens if you look at us as fundamentally the same?” There are no easy answers to the question of pragmatics, and indeed this should be subject to continuing debate. One could venture, for example, that most scientific inquiry of this kind has little value one way or another, as it seldom escapes the pages of a discipline’s journals. However, should a more public audience be reached, one could replace the animus toward the implicit imperialism, with a more positive argument for the contribution such a view can make to international collaboration. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, is implicitly based on the assumption of a shared humanity.

In turning to cross-cultural psychology, we may again consider issues of pragmatics and politics. To what kind of world does such work contribute, for example, in differentiating between collective as opposed to individualist cultures, or to suggest that people in one culture are more or less extraverted, agreeable, or conscientious than those in another? On the negative side, one might certainly be concerned with the stereotypes generated or supported by such descriptions. To appreciate the point, one may recall the intense resistance to earlier research attempting to document trait differences between Anglo and African Americans, and between males and females. One might argue, more positively that cultural stereotypes might prepare Western professionals who are collaborating or counseling those from other cultures. Being apprised that “they are less individualistic” may, in terms of Western understandings, contribute to more adequate forms of relating.
From a constructionist standpoint, there is much to be said in support of both the cultural psychology and indigenous movements. When such accounts of the person are shared with those outside the culture in question, they can invite an empathic curiosity in “the other.” They ask that one suspend the common sense assumptions of his or her home culture, and to imagine oneself into another form of understanding and action. In so doing, they invite an expansion of one’s sense of the possible, and invite an innovative orientation to future planning. Cultural and indigenous psychologies also risk danger. Depending on the characterizations, the culture in question may come to be seen as so radically alien that future relations are jeopardized. For those working within any indigenous movement there is substantial socio-political value. Indigenous psychology provides a venue for celebrating and exploring one’s heritage, while simultaneously establishing means for resisting the erosion of valued traditions resulting from globalization. At the same time, echoing earlier arguments, the indigenous movement runs the danger of insularity and self-destructive recalcitrance to change. We shall return to this issue shortly.

In sum, from a constructionist orientation there is no fundamental antagonism among these various orientations to inclusion. All represent possible ways of constructing the world. There is no compelling reason to abandon any of them, nor to glorify one to the exclusion of the others. Each offers valuable potentials. At the same time, the realization of these potentials carries with it an array of socio-political consequences that deserve continuing scrutiny.

Communication as Relationship

As we saw, when the argument for indigenous psychology was extended, it posed a major threat to the very idea of communicating across cultures. So long as communication is understood as a form of inter-subjective connection—a view shared from all four standpoints in question—then valid communication is precluded. We are ultimately left with a search for the meanings residing in other minds, supplied only with constructs (cognitions, meaning systems, construals) supplied by our own culture. In effect, understanding can only take place in terms already in our possession. We can never know whether the emotion of love, for example, is experienced in other cultures, because the only means of understanding is through our own culturally based categories.

A constructionist orientation provides an escape from this distressing conundrum. First of all, constructionism enables us to suspend the terms in which the problem has been formulated. As Rorty (1980) proposed, for example, the centuries old problems plaguing the philosophy of epistemology are all based on positing two worlds, an inner or subjective world, on the one hand and an external or material world on the other. However, the inner/outer binary is optional; suspend the binary and the traditional problems of epistemology drop away.
In the same way, if we suspend the presumption that valid communication is based on some form of inter-subjective resonance or connection, the longstanding problem of cross-cultural communication can be suspended. And, in turn, we can attempt to devise alternative conceptualizations of greater promise.

Just such a conceptualization has emerged in recent decades, drawing inspiration from the writings of Bakhtin (1981), Wittgenstein (1953), and Derrida (1976)—all of whom attempt to account for linguistic meaning without subscribing to a dualist metaphysics. For Bakhtin and Wittgenstein in particular, the origins of meaning are traced to the coordinated actions among persons—to dialogue in the former case and language games in the latter. Or, in brief, language attains its meaning from its use within relationships. On this account, meaning does not reside in the heads of individuals, but emerges from the process of coordination itself. Thus, understanding is achieved in a relationship, not when the parties can each penetrate the mind of the other, but when they have achieved mutually satisfactory forms of coordinated action—linguistic and otherwise. A more extended account of this relational orientation to meaning can be found in my 2009 book, *Relational being: Beyond self and community*.

In brief, this account suggests that culture is always under construction in terms of its patterns of coordinated action. Culture is not buried deeply within the minds of its participants, but is carried within the taken for granted forms of relating, and these within the array of material objects, structures and the like that derive from and support these coordinations. A sub-culture of soccer, for example, is sustained not only by a language (e.g. “goal,” “defender,” “yellow card”) but an array of coordinated actions (among players, referees, coaches) and a range of objects or structures (e.g. ball, goals, field). Understanding the culture of soccer is not a matter of translating this vast domain of coordinations into another language (e.g. scholarly inscription), but participating in the process in a mutually congenial way. We shall return to this issue shortly.

**Culture: Deconstruction and Reconstruction**

A final problem plaguing the various attempts at a culturally inclusive psychology concerns the very attempt to characterize culture. How is it possible to describe or comprehend a “culture” without obliterating sub-cultural variations, and ignoring temporal transformation? And in the latter case, given the global flow of people, ideas, values, and so on, it is increasingly difficult to speak of culture in terms of a stable, geographically located people. In effect, as the argument goes, characterizations of culture are misleading or erroneous in their inattention to variation—both synchronic and diachronic. Although this line of critique may seem condemning, a social constructionist orientation invites a reexamination.

At the outset, it is important to recognize that the very idea of culture is a construction. Whether the idea of culture is intelligible, and the varying ways in
which culture has been characterized across time and place, make clear the negotiated character of the concept. The same holds for characterizations of any “sub-culture,” along with accounts of temporal change of diffusions in culture. So, from a constructionist standpoint, it makes little sense to criticize traditional accounts of “culture” for being “misleading or erroneous.” Abandoning questions concerning “the truth about culture,” we are moved again to consider the pragmatic and political consequences of making characterizations of culture, sub-cultures, or cultural change. We have already considered some of the advantages and disadvantages of characterizing cultural analysis and differences. Many of the same arguments are relevant to characterizing sub-cultures. In “making real” the existence of sub-cultures, the scholar shifts the focus from what is general across a group of people, to what is unique within its ranks. Curiosity and creativity may result, with the attendant danger of generating distance and alienation. The more recent concerns with “culture on the move” are important in opening new vistas of theory and practice. Traditional accounts of culture emphasize stasis, locking n a particular view along with recommended forms of practice. By shifting the scholarly gaze toward change, we invite the development of a new array of concepts and practices. We move into a generative space of theorizing (Gergen, 1982).

Dialogue and Difference

As we find, there are numerous problems that plague traditional attempts to establish a culture inclusive psychology, whether that inclusion be derived from a universalist or a culturally particularist standpoint. However, most of these problems inhere in the assumptive network with which relevant inquiry has taken place. Conceptions of representational validity, empiricist methodology, dualism, rights to representation, and cultural variability are all in play. From a constructionist standpoint, however, we may suspend the traditional assumptions, and return to the possibility of cultural inclusion, and focus on issues of pragmatic and valuational potential. Yet, while this new focus does much to legitimate the full range of voices concerned with psychology in and across cultural contexts, little has been said about the means of achieving a working process of inclusion. We are still left, at the end of the discussion so far, with an image of multiple groups generating multiple realities for disparate ends. This may be a useful beginning to inclusion, but it is scarcely an acceptable end.

Echoing the voices of numerous psychologists in the cultural domain, the crucial need is for dialogue across the many enclaves of concern. Productive dialogue has thus far been in short supply, partly owing to what many within a given enclave feel to be the irrelevance of the alternatives, and as well the mutual criticisms. There is also the incapacity of the dualist account of human action to prove a credible account of communication. Yet, we have seen that from a
constructionist perspective, we can both remove the grounds for alienation, and provide a credible alternative account of the dialogic process. Dialogue across cultures is essentially a challenge to mutual coordination.

In this context, it is important to distinguish between expropriating and appropriating dialogue. The former refers to attempts by representatives from differing cultural enclaves to understand each other, and especially in this case with the hope of drawing from each other in ways that can enrich their own psychological orientation. A signal case of expropriating dialogue is currently taking place in the attempt of Western psychologists to understand the Buddhist tradition with the aim of developing mindfulness practices for human well-being. What is most important to understand in this case is that there is no “getting it right” in terms of the Asian culture’s understanding and practices. Criticisms of “diluted” Buddhism are inappropriate on this account, as the process of coordination will inevitably mean juxtaposing Asian words and practices with those of the West. In the resulting form of life, both Asian and Western traditions will be transformed.

Within the process of appropriating dialogue lies the potential for “getting it right” with respect to another culture’s tradition. Understanding in this case entails direct immersion in the life-worlds of the culture in question. One does not “learn about” the culture in this case, but through progressive coordination, “learns with.” Ideally this would include mastering the language and ways of life—of eating, socializing, working, conducting family affairs, participating in rituals, and so on—of “going native” as the anthropologist might put it. This form of knowing is not transferable in the sense of one’s subsequently describing or teaching within one’s home culture. For again, in this context we move to forms of expropriating dialogue. Most fascinating here is the way in which expropriating dialogue serves as the context for incubating new cultural forms. Here again we shift the gaze from culture as formed, to the continuous transformation of culture—from culture to “culturing.”

Kenneth J. Gergen
Swarthmore College
Psychology
Swarthmore
United States
kgergen1@swarthmore.edu

REFERENCES


© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd


© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd